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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4402
Less restrictive product market policies are crucial in 
promoting convergence to higher levels of GDP per 
capita. This paper benchmarks product market policies 
in Romania to those of OECD countries by estimating 
OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation 
(PMR). The PMR indicators allow a comprehensive 
mapping of policies affecting competition in product 
markets. Comparison with OECD countries reveals that 
Romania’s product market policies are less restrictive 
This paper—a product of the Chief Economist Office of the Europe and Central Asia Region—is part of a larger effort to 
benchmark ECA countries against OECD countries in various dimensions of policy reform. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dderosa@worldbank.org. 
of competition than most direct comparators from the 
region and not far from the OECD average. Nonetheless, 
this achievement should be interpreted in light of the fact 
that PMR approach measures officially adopted policies. 
It does not capture implementation and enforcement, the 
area where future reform efforts should be directed if less 
restrictive policies are to have an effective impact on long-
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1.  On January 1, 2007, Romania became a member of the European Union.  This 
achievement was in part made possible by a substantial reform effort that has allowed 
Romania to make impressive progress towards long-term stability and sustained growth 
in the last six years. 
 
2.  Nonetheless, the income gap with the new member states of the EU remains large.  
In order to sustain growth and improve competitiveness, a second generation of reforms 
has been put in place to help the country’s successful integration in EU and global 
markets.  A cornerstone of this reform agenda is the implementation of less restrictive 
product market policies that enable firms to put resources, both capital and labor, to their 
most efficient use. 
 
3.  This paper presents a comparative analysis of Romania’s performance in product 
market regulation (PMR).  The approach used relies on a methodology developed by the 
OECD (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 2005), that measures the degree to which domestic 
policies inhibit or promote competition.  The data – which are derived from a self-
reported survey – is policy-focused as opposed to perception based (or based on market 
outcomes).  It is available for OECD members and Brazil.  Data for Romania were first 
collected in 2002 in the context of an OECD country study on Romania (OECD 2002a) 
and then again in early 2006.  
 
4.  The key finding is that Romania’s product market policies appear to be less 
restrictive of competition than most direct comparators from the region and not far from 
the OECD average (as estimated on the basis of data collected in 2003).  This result is 
particularly impressive when compared to its earlier score: OECD (2002a), employing an 
earlier version of the PMR methodology, found that product market policies in Romania 
were among the most restrictive compared to OECD countries.  This implies that over the 
past few years Romania has engaged in a comprehensive reform effort across a wide 
array of product market policies.  Such striking improvement is in line with the findings 
of other surveys such as Doing Business, which shows Romania to have improved its 
ranking from 71 out of 155 countries in 2005 to 49 out of 175 in 2006. 
 
5.  There are, however, two important caveats to this otherwise impressive 
achievement. The first is that the PMR approach measures officially adopted policies.  It 
does not capture implementation and enforcement.  In fact, interviews with business 
association suggest a significant gap between officially adopted policies, on the one hand, 
and implementation and enforcement, on the other.  While Romania has achieved 
impressive results in terms of having laws that are more conducive to private sector 
development, the lack of a greater effort in terms of implementation and enforcement 
would substantially reduce the impact of the policies adopted in recent years that could 
hurt the competitiveness of the Romanian economy in the longer run.  
 
6.  The second is that the analysis compared Romania in 2006 with OECD countries 
in 2003 (the latest year in which a PMR survey was conducted).  This does not detract  
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from the remarkable progress Romania has made and certainly allows for a relevant 
comparison between Romania and other countries of the region just prior to their joining 
the EU.  However, it does imply that Romania’s excellent performance leaves no room 
for complacency.  Most OECD countries have actively continued to improve their 
product markets over the last three or four years.  As such, the present paper 
overestimates how Romania ranks relative to competitors today.   
 
7.  The present paper provides a detailed look at the various components of product 
market regulation and suggests areas in which further progress could be made, at least 
with respect to official policies.  Some steps to improve implementation are also 
proposed.  These include (i) greater political commitment at the highest level to take the 
lead in application and enforcement of rules and regulations; (ii) changes in the 
institutional architecture of the government to improve oversight and coordination; and 
(iii) implementation of measures to enhance the capacity of the public administration, 
especially its lower echelons, to support the reform agenda.  
 
8.  We now turn to a presentation of the PMR methodology and a discussion of the 
choice of benchmarks, before presenting the results of the benchmarking exercise, 
looking first at inward oriented policies before briefly discussing outward oriented 
policies (which, as of January 1, 2007, are largely governed by EU rules and agreements).  
The last section concludes with some suggestions for next steps. 
 
THE PMR METHODOLOGY 
 
9.  A regulatory environment propitious to competition in product markets is widely 
believed to have positive repercussions on long run economic performance (Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta 2003) and productivity convergence (Conway et al. 2006a and 2007).  This 
may occur by promoting a more efficient allocation of resources both across and within 
sectors (Nickel 1996).  A more competitive environment may also stimulate innovation 
and technological diffusion, thus enhancing dynamic efficiency (Aghion et al., 2001). 
 
10.  Product market regulation (PMR) is measurable through a methodology 
developed at the OECD relying on the OECD Regulatory indicators questionnaire.  The 
methodology and key findings of the PMR for OECD countries are presented in Nicoletti 
et al. (1999) and Conway et al. (2005).  The PMR indicators summarize information on 
economy-wide and industry-specific regulatory provisions.  
 
11.  The PMR indicators are designed to reflect regulations that have the potential to 
restrict competition in areas where competition is viable.  By construction, they have a 
number of features which make them useful not only for analysis, but, more importantly, 
for policy advice, since they allow to pinpoint specific policies that hamper competition 
in product markets.  First, PMR indicators are focused on enacted policies and not on 
outcomes, implying that they are ‘objective’, in that they are not based on opinion 
surveys.  Second, since the summary PMR indicator is constructed as the average of well 
defined components, PMR scores can be related to specific underlying policies, thus 
providing precise inputs in the phase of policy recommendation.  Finally, PMR indicators  
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focus on regulatory measures that affect the economy at large and can therefore be 
considered as comprehensive measures of regulatory restrictiveness.  Their advantages 
notwithstanding, PMR indicators are not designed to capture informal regulatory 
practices nor the effective enforcement of regulations, since they are only concerned 
with formal compliance with a number of criteria. 
 
12.  Data were collected for Romania for the purpose of the present exercise, covering 
four of the six “sections” of the OECD product market regulation database.
1  The first 
section deals with general regulatory policy issues, concerning public ownership; market 
access and competition issues; market structure and vertical relationships in utilities and 
other network industries.  The second section covers regulatory and administrative 
policies, such as processes and capacities in the public administration.  The third section 
covers regulation in transportation industries, focusing on market access, business 
conduct, and market structure in road freight, railways and passenger air travel.  The final 
section covers regulation in retail distribution, focusing on the regulatory environment, 
industry behavior and prices.  Information from Doing Business 2006 was used for a fifth 
section of the PMR - administrative burdens on startups.  
 
Figure 1. The PMR indicator system 
     
Economic regulation
Administrative regulation
1.The numbers in brackets indicate the weight given to each lower level indicator in the calculation of the higher level indicator immediately above it. 
The weights were derived by applying principal components analysis to the set of indicators in each of the main regulatory domains (state control, barriers to 
entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and investment, economic regulation and administrative regulation). The same approach was used to derive the weights used 
to calculate the indicators of inward and outward-oriented policies and the overall PMR indicator. The principal components analysis was based on 
the original 1998 data.
2. Two indicators from the 1998 version of the PMR indicators ('Special voting rights' and 'Control of public enterprise by legislative bodies') have been combined into this indicator.
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Source: Conway et al. (2005) 
13.  The structure of the PMR system is shown in Figure 1.  The system is composed 
of 16 basic or ‘low-level’ indicators, each capturing a specific aspect of the regulatory 
                                                 
1 The OECD questionnaire adapted for Romania is provided in Annex 2. For a comprehensive reference see 
www.oecd.org/eco/pmr.  
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regime as described in Box 1.  The basic indicators are progressively aggregated in more 
comprehensive policy areas.  The highest level of aggregation corresponds to the 
summary measure of product market regulation in the country.  
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Box 1. The 16 low-level PMR indicators 
These indicators cover a wide range of product market policies and include:  
INWARD ORIENTED POLICIES 
State control: Public ownership 
  Scope of public enterprises: this indicator measures the pervasiveness of state ownership across business sectors as the 
proportion of sectors in which the state has an equity stake in at least one firm. 
  Size of public enterprise: reflects the overall size of state-owned enterprises relative to the size of the economy. 
  Direct control over business enterprises: measures the existence of government special voting rights in privately-owned 
firms, constraints on the sale of state-owned equity stakes, and the extent to which legislative bodies control the strategic 
choices of public enterprises.  
State control: Involvement in business operations 
 Price  controls: reflects the extent of price controls in specific sectors. 
  Use of command and control regulation: indicates the extent to which government uses coercive (as opposed to incentive-
based) regulation in general and in specific service sectors. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Regulatory and administrative opacity  
  Licenses and permits systems: reflects the use of ‘one-stop shops’ and ‘silence is consent’ rules for getting information on 
and issuing licenses and permits. 
  Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: reflects aspects of government’s communication strategy and 
efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative burden of interacting with government. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Administrative burden on corporations 
  Administrative burdens for corporations: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of corporations.
2 
  Administrative burdens for sole proprietors: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of sole proprietor firms.
3 
  Sector-specific administrative burdens: reflects administrative burdens in the road transport and retail distribution sectors. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Barriers to competition 
  Legal barriers: measures the scope of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in a wide range of 
business sectors. 
  Antitrust exemptions: measures the scope of exemptions to competition law for public enterprises. 
 
OUTWARD ORIENTED POLICIES 
Barriers to trade and investment: Explicit barriers  
  Foreign Ownership barriers: reflects legal restrictions on foreign acquisition of equity in public and private firms and in 
the telecommunications and airlines sectors. 
  Tariffs: reflects the (simple) average of most-favoured-nation tariffs. 
  Discriminatory procedures: reflects the extent of discrimination against foreign firms at the procedural level. 
Barriers to trade and investment: Regulatory barriers  
  Regulatory barriers: reflects other barriers to international trade (e.g.  international harmonisation, mutual 
recognition agreements). 
_______________________________ 
Source: reproduced from Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005 
                                                 
2 Data from Doing Business in 2005 was used to construct this indicator.  
3 This indicator is not available for Romania as information about it was not included in the adapted questionnaire 
for Romania.  
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14.  The indicators are calculated on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative 
information obtained from questionnaire answers.  Qualitative data are assigned a 
numerical value that allows ordering each of the possible responses to a given question.  
Quantitative information is ranked by subdividing it into categories based on a system of 
thresholds.  The coded information is then normalized over a scale of zero to six.  These 
data are then aggregated into basic or ‘low-level’ indicators by assigning subjective 
weights to the various regulatory requirements.  Given the normalization of the basic 
data, all the low-level indicators also have a scale of zero to six, reflecting increasing 
restrictiveness of regulatory areas.
4  A detailed description of the low level indicators is 
presented in the Annex.  
 
15.  Basic indicators are then aggregated into broader regulatory domains.  Higher 
level indicators are calculated as weighted averages of their constituent lower level 
indicators.  The attribution of lower-level indicators to each higher-level indicator, and 
the weights used in the aggregation, are based on principal component analysis (Nicoletti 
et al., 1999).  At the highest level of aggregation the overall indicator of product market 
regulation summarizes the restrictiveness of the regulatory framework in the product 
market.  The structure of the PMR system, with progressive levels of aggregation, has the 
advantage of allowing a decomposition of higher-level indicators, with an increasing 
degree of detail, into the values of the more disaggregated indicators, each corresponding 




16.  The most obvious benchmarks for Romania are Bulgaria (for which data are 
available for 2006), and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are also OECD 
members (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic collectively 
referred to as the OECD CEE).  The fact that the data are from 2003, when the OECD 
CEE were at about the same point as Romania in 2006 relative to their accession to the 
EU, makes them even better benchmarks.  Nevertheless, when interpreting comparative 
results, it should be kept in mind that comparators are likely to have made further 
progress since 2003. 
 
17.  Additionally, comparison with Romania’s 2002 PMR results provides an 
indication of the progress made in product market policies.  However, since the 2002 
PMR was estimated using an earlier methodology, the 2006 and 2002 scores for Romania 
are not strictly comparable.  Nonetheless, both the order of magnitude and the relative 
standing of Romania clearly show an impressive drive towards adoption of product 
market policies that are less restrictive of competition in recent years.
 5 
 
18.  Extension of the benchmarking exercise to Brazil, Mexico and Turkey offers a 
broader perspective on other middle income countries (MICs) with different historical 
                                                 
4 The calculation of low-level indicators, including the weights used, is based on Conway et al. (2005). 
5 See Nicoletti and Scarpetta (1999) for a description of PMR 1998 results. Conway et al. (2005) re-
estimate PMR 1998 indicators using the PMR 2003 methodology and show that orders of magnitude and 
country rankings remain virtually unchanged.  
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experiences.  Finally, comparison with the OECD or high income EU15 countries helps 
identify longer-term objectives for policymakers.
6   
 
19.  These benchmarks are used in the graphs.  Romania’s score relative to the full set 
of countries (30 OECD members in 2003, Brazil in 2004 and Bulgaria in 2006) is shown 
in Appendix I for all PMR indicators.   
 
THE ROMANIAN CONTEXT 
 
20.  Until 2000, Romania was one of the poorest performing economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe.  The turnaround in 2000 was preceded by a protracted and precipitous 
decline in GDP, a peaking of the poverty rate to 36 percent, and inflation of 54 percent 
per year.  EU accession aspirations and the opening of official entry negotiations with the 
EU in December 1999 spurred Romania’s commitment to reforms.  This led to significant 
macroeconomic consolidation and impressive growth in recent years. 
 
21.  As a result of the reforms, the economy has been growing at a robust 5 to 6 
percent per year over the last six years.  The main drivers for this growth have been 
investment and exports - and occasionally domestic consumption - that responded 
strongly to improved confidence in banks and macroeconomic stabilization.  Inflation 
declined from above 40 percent in 2000 to 4.9 percent in 2006, the lowest level since the 
start of the transition.  Fiscal consolidation, characterized by a cut in public expenditures 
of around 4% of GDP, allowed for a reduction in both inflationary pressures and the 
consolidated budget deficit.  The latter shrank from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.7 
percent in 2006.  In addition, a combination of sustained growth and external migration 
permitted a substantial decrease in registered unemployment, down to around 5 percent 
of the labor force. 
 
22.  The EU accession process also set the stage for a broad and sustained structural 
and institutional reform agenda.  Privatization of commercial companies picked up, 
especially in banking and the energy sector, though it slowed down somewhat in 2006.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) substantially increased after 2000, with inflows 
exceeding 5-6 percent of GDP per year recently.  Institutional and governance reforms 
advanced, with the first generation measures, focused on the establishment of the legal 
framework and the redesign of the institutional architecture of the public sector, either 
adopted or in the process of being implemented. 
 
23.  Important steps were also taken to upgrade the regulatory framework for 
businesses, remove administrative barriers and enhance the business climate.  A major 
step forward was the adoption by the government, starting with 2001, of an annual Action 
Plan to remove administrative barriers to businesses.
7  The implementation of the Action 
Plan, updated annually, is overseen by a working group representing stakeholders, and its 
results are measured through surveys.  This has led to the simplification of administrative 
                                                 
6 The EU15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
7 This was supported by a program with the World Bank (the PSAL and subsequent PAL programs).  
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and regulatory procedures and the decrease of the transaction costs for business entry and 
operation.  As a result, Romania was ranked as the second most dynamic reformer in the 
world by the World Bank 2007 Doing Business report it terms of improving the legal and 
regulatory framework for business.  
 
24.  These remarkable achievements notwithstanding, important aspects of the 
regulatory environment still need to be improved.  This is true with regard to the quality 
of the rules and regulations, but more so with respect to their efficient enforcement.   
Business surveys suggest that sizeable regulatory obstacles to resource allocation remain, 
unnecessarily increasing the transaction costs for companies and hampering job creation. 
Some of these will be further documented in the paper. 
 
25.  A central element of the regulatory reform agenda to be pursued by Romania is 
the continued implementation of less restrictive factor and product market policies and, 
even more so, the strengthening of the institutional framework for their effective 
implementation.  This would encourage a more efficient allocation of resources and 
improve labor productivity.  This is especially important given the significant gaps that 
Romania has in terms of incomes and productivity with EU members and the 
demographic trends laying ahead.  Romania entered the EU with an estimated per capita 
income level of about 35% of the average for EU-15.
8  In addition, employment and 
participation rates, albeit improving recently, remain among the lowest in the EU.   
Evidence suggests that the reforms are paying off and that Romania is gradually, but 
constantly, catching up with the EU. 
 
BENCHMARKING PRODUCTION MARKET POLICIES IN ROMANIA 
 
26.  Enhancing competition in product markets has been found to positively affect 
GDP per capita by providing incentives to firms to reallocate resources to more 
productive activities, increase innovation and technological diffusion.  In addition, less 
restrictive regulations may positively affect employment by reducing the rents that some 
firms extract from overregulation and force firms to expand their activities
9.  
 
27.  Benchmarking product market regulation has proved to be a useful tool for 
monitoring the performance of policies and institutions in OECD countries and for 
identifying specific policy gaps, thus offering the opportunity to benefit from the 
experience of other member states.  Two surveys have been conducted so far collecting 
data for 1998 and 2003.   Results from these surveys point to a convergence in product 
market policies across OECD countries, with substantial improvements achieved by 
countries that originally exhibited relatively restrictive product market regulations, such 
as Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, France, Mexico, Korea, Hungary, and 
Spain (Figure 2)  Substantial improvements in easing product market policies have been 
also achieved among EU15 countries where the average PMR score fell from 2.1 in 1998 
to 1.4 in 2003.  While this reflects the increasing harmonization of EU common market 
rules, the PMR benchmarking may have been instrumental in fostering this improvement.   
                                                 
8 Eurostat. 
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Source: Conway et al. (2005). Note: the 1998 data were re-based to be made more comparable to the 2003 
data, given the change in methodology.  This explains the slight differences in the data for 1998 between 
figure 2 and figure 3.a.  
 
28.  This positive effect is very much noticeable in Romania.  In 2002 it ranked 
towards the bottom of the league of the 28 countries for which the overall PMR indicator 
was available.  In 2006, out of 33 countries, Romania can confidently be ranked as one of 









































Source: Nicoletti et al. (1999) and OECD (2002a). Note: Data refer to 2002 for Romania and 1998 for other 
countries. Methodology changed somewhat in 2003 so the ratings are not strictly comparable between 
Figures 3.a and 3.b.  For details on the change see Conway et al (2005). 
 
 







































90% confidence interval (2003) 2003 PMR Indicator
Relatively Restrictive
Relatively Liberal
Source:  Conway, Janod, Nicoletti (2005)  and, for Bulgaria and Romania,  World Bank estimates based on 
information provided by Bulgarian and Romanian  authorities and Doing Business in 2005. Note: the 
values refer to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.   
Note: Values refer to 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania and 2003 for all other countries. The confidence 
intervals are calculated using stochastic weights on the low-level indicators to generate a distribution of 
overall PMR indicators for each country.  The 90 per cent confidence intervals are calculated from that 
distribution.  Indicator values for the 'relatively liberal' and 'relatively restrictive' countries are significantly 
different at the 90 percent level of confidence (Conway, Janod, Nicoletti, 2005).  
11 
 
29.  Today, rules and regulations governing Romania’s product market policies are 
less restrictive than most other middle income countries.  Even relative to its closest 
comparators, Bulgaria in 2006 and the OECD countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 
2003, Romania appears to be among the less restrictive countries, positioning itself 
slightly above the OECD and EU averages (Figure 4). 
 
 



































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. OECD CEE include Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic.  The values refer to 2006 for Romania and Bulgaria, 
2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different 
methodology so is not strictly comparable.  
 
30.  We now turn to an analysis of the various components of the PMR indicator, in 
order to examine in greater detail some of the drivers of this excellent performance, but 
also to identify remaining sources of restrictiveness of product market regulation.  A 
useful approach in doing so is to decompose the indicator into inward and outward 
oriented policies.  The former include policies and regulations that determine the degree 
of state control and barriers to entrepreneurship, while the latter reflect policies and 
regulations that affect barriers to trade and investment.  Detailed description of the basic 
indicators included in the indicators of inward and outward oriented policies follows in 
the next sections. 
 
31.  In general, average performance seems better in all countries for outward- than 
for inward-oriented policies (Figure 5).  This is certainly due to the requirements imposed 
by international agreements - such as the WTO charters, and, for EU countries, 
membership of the European Union - which are more binding in matters concerning trade 
and foreign direct investment.  Greater reform challenges, as well as greater cross-
country variation, lie with the regulations that fall under the category of inward-oriented 
policies.  Within this general framework, Romania’s product market regulations appear to 
be more restrictive of competition than the OECD and EU averages for outward oriented 




Figure 5. Inward and outward oriented policies 












































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I.   
 
32.  The fact that Romania positions itself around the EU average for inward oriented 
policies suggests that it has already met most of the requirements of the acquis 
communautaire.  More generally, the great progress observed since 2002 in inward-
oriented policies can be attributed to both the implementation of the acquis 
communautaire (e.g. competition policy), and to implementation of less restrictive 
policies in areas that are subject to domestic discretion.  This indicates that the 
government has been diligent in complying with international commitments in domains 
that are often controversial from the standpoint of gathering sufficient domestic 
consensus. 
 
33.  As for outward-oriented policies, the data, hence the ranking and score, reflect 
policies in place as of the spring of 2006.  A number of these have changed by the mere 
fact of Romania joining the EU and therefore becoming governed by EU trade policies 
and agreements.  Inward and outward oriented policies and the underlying indicators are 
discussed in details below.  
 
Inward Oriented Policies 
 
34.  In order to identify the drivers of Romania’s progress since 2002, inward-oriented 
policies can be decomposed into two broad categories: indicators of state control and 
barriers to entrepreneurship (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Barriers to entrepreneurship and state control 
a. Barriers to entrepreneurship  b. State control 
0.5













































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
35.  Barriers to entrepreneurship (such as barriers to competition, regulatory and 
administrative opacity, and administrative burdens on start-ups) which were already low 
in 2002, have since declined further in 2006, thus placing Romania in a better position 
than all comparator groups, including other middle income countries, pre-accession 
Central European countries, as well as the OECD average.  
 
36.  Visible but still limited progress has been made in the area of state control, where 
Romania still lags behind the OECD and EU averages and far from the performance of its 
more direct comparators, such as the Slovak Republic in 2003.  Nonetheless, Romania’s 
disengagement from state control since 2002 mirrors the evolution of state control in the 
OECD, where countries that had relatively restrictive policies in 1998 have succeeded in 
reducing the extent of state control in 2003 by removing price controls and reducing 
reliance on coercive, as opposed to incentive-based, regulations.  
 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 
Barriers to Competition 
 
37.  In terms of barriers to competition (as measured by licenses and permits 
requirements and antitrust exemptions) Romania’s performance is comparable to both the 
rest of the EU and other MICs (Annex Table A1.3).  This is largely due to Romania’s 
diligence in incorporating EU rules and practices in national legislation.  This resulted in 
the elimination of antitrust exemptions for state-owned enterprises (Campeanu et al., 
2003). In this regard Romania fares very well and even better than EU15 and the average 
for the OECD countries (Figure 7).   
 
38.  On the other hand, Romania’s performance in terms of other legal barriers to 
competition, in the form of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors 
allowed in certain business sectors, appears to have worsened relative to 2002.  This  
14 
could well be due to the change in methodologies.  Whatever the reason, this appears to 
be one of the few categories in which Romania does not rank well.  As in many other 
OECD and EU countries, this result appears to be driven by the existence of legal 
restrictions to entry in network and utilities sectors, such as rail, road and air transport 
infrastructure; electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply; and gas 
production, transmission, distribution and supply; and telecommunications (see table 
A2.10 for details). 
 
Figure 7. Barriers to Competition 
a. Legal barriers (licenses and permit 
requirements)   











































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
Regulatory and Administrative Opacity  
 
39.  Romania scores well in terms of regulatory and administrative opacity (Annex 
table A1.3).  It has made substantial progress in the simplification of licenses and 
permits, (Figure 8a) while maintaining its 2002 best practice positioning in terms of 
communication and simplification of rules and procedures (Figure 8b).  The indicator 
captures aspects of the government’s communication strategy and its efforts to reduce 
and simplify the administrative burden of interacting with the government. 
 
40.  This reflects the substantial efforts made by Romania in streamlining licensing 
regimes since the previous PMR survey (OECD 2002a).  Indeed, the simplification of 
licensing procedures has been a central theme of the country’s Action Plans for 
improving the business environment.  Important milestones in the simplification process 
include: the reduction of the number of products and services requiring licensing; the 
removal of some barriers to free trade, the elimination of some import-export licenses; 
the simplification of licensing procedures for retailers through the elimination of ex-ante 
licenses, the use of voluntary assumption of responsibility statements, the strengthening 
of ex-post control and monitoring; the establishment of the one-stop shop and the 
elimination of some licenses; the adoption of the Silent Approval Law (2003), which 
establishes a maximum period of 30 days for the approval of a certain set of licenses and 
authorizations from the moment of the application.    
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Figure 8. Regulatory and Administrative Opacity 
















































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
41.  Romania has also implemented a number of reforms to improve the 
communication of rules and procedures to affected parties.  The annual Action Plans to 
improve the business environment contain communication components whose aim is to 
enhance the interaction between the administration and the business community, some of 
which are discussed in Box 2.  
 
42.  Improvements in this domain are reflected in firm level surveys.  For instance, 
BEEPS data suggest that the percentage of senior management time devoted to dealing 
with public officials in connection with regulation or access to public services has 
Box 2. Romania’s efforts at simplification and better communication of rules and regulations 
 
Measures adopted as part of the Plans include the development of a government site targeting 
communication with businesses (www.mdp-mediuafaceri.ro), which contains updated information 
relevant for companies, such as changes in legislation, explanation of implementation norms for laws, 
links to relevant ministries and government agencies, funding opportunities. 
 
Most of the important pieces of legislation impacting upon the business climate, such as the Silence-is-
consent Law, the Decisional Transparency Law, the Free Access to Public Information Law, also 
benefited from broad media dissemination campaigns, including TV, radio and newspapers 
presentations, brochures and posters, direct free access telephone information lines to the government.  
Other traditional means of communication, such as meetings with relevant stakeholders, including 
businesses associations were broadly used, and company surveys were carried out, including by FIAS, 
to capture satisfaction with the changes and suggestions for further measures.  
 
To improve the interface between government and companies, an e-government site (www.e-
guvernare.ro) was established.  The site allows businesses to access various forms and documents 
relevant for the interaction with the authority.  A stakeholders group, which includes the most important 
business associations, oversees the implementation of the Action Plans.       
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declined from over nine percent to less than two percent between 2002 and 2005.
10  
Nonetheless, despite these substantial efforts and achievements, the communication 
strategies of the authorities only partially succeeded to reach the mass of companies 
impacted upon.  Many firms still complain about a gap between the provisions of the 
rules and their practical implementation, while others continue to find the access to 
relevant information difficult.  Surveys suggest, for example, that many companies have 
not even heard about the Silent Approval law.   
 
43.  Perhaps as a result the improvements in the rules and regulations were not 
reflected in perception-based indicators.  Thus, Doing Business 2007 ranks Romania 
116
th out of 172 countries in terms of dealing with licenses, even though Romania does 
well in the overall ease of doing businesses.  A similar finding is reported by the BEEPS 
surveys that report that 40% of firms consider licenses to be a problem for doing business 
in the country.  This is substantially worse than among comparator countries, and does 
not appear to have improved markedly since 2002 (Figure 9).  
 
44.  Surveys and discussions with companies suggest that, while a limited number of 
firms seems to be severely affected, most of the difficulties arise for those requesting 
production and construction licenses.  The procedures for obtaining a construction 
authorization and the certificate for urbanism seem to be long.  The procedures to 
subsequently connect buildings to utilities, mainly gas and electricity, are also long and 
relatively costly.  This paper recommends continuing the simplification of these 
procedures, as this is critical to the smooth implementation of projects financed from the 
EU structural and cohesion funds, especially in infrastructure and environment.  
 
Figure 9. Business Licenses as a Problem for Doing Business (percent of firms indicating business 























Slovakia Turkey Hungary Bulgaria Poland Romania
2002 2005
 
Source: EBRD-WB BEEPS, 2005.   
                                                 
10 The 2002 and 2005 BEEPS surveys ask the question “What percent of senior management’s time in 2001 
was spent in dealing with public officials about the application and interpretation of laws and regulations 
and to get or to maintain access to public services?”  
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Administrative Burdens on Start-Ups 
 
45.  Romania’s policies in terms of facilitating the creation of new firms remain liberal 
relative to 2002, since administrative burdens are lower than among comparators for 
startups in general, and in specific service sectors, such as road transport and retail 
distribution (Figure 10).  The indicator of administrative burdens for corporation 
measures the number of procedures, number of days, and the minimum capital required 
to start a limited liability company. 
 
Figure 10. Administrative Burdens on Startups 
a. Administrative burdens on businesses  b. Sector specific administrative burden 
0.8
1.4












































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I.  
 
46.  The burden on business creation is substantially lower than in other countries 
even the EU15 and the OECD.  The number and duration of procedures, as well as the 
cost involved in starting a company is lower in Romania than in other middle income 
countries and on a par with the best practice of top performers in the EU, such as Ireland 
or the UK.  
 
47.  This could, however, be partly driven by the fact that slightly different data and 
methods were used to calculate this indicator for Romania.  A homogenization procedure 
was therefore necessary to make its score comparable to the other countries (see Table 
A2.8 for details).  However, this excellent ranking is consistent with Doing Business’ 
data that rank Romania as the 7
th best country (out of 175) in terms of ease of starting a 
business (it was the 6
th in 2005).   
 
48.  Romania’s rankings and good performance vis-à-vis the ease of starting a 
business reflect the continued simplification and reduction (down to five) of the company 
registration procedures, especially after 2004.  These took central stage in three 
consecutive Action Plans (2004, 2005, and 2006) for the reduction of administrative 
barriers to entry and operation of businesses, and were part of the PSAL/PAL programs.  
The establishment of one-stop shops for firm registration played an important role in this 
progress.  The measures implemented through the Action Plans followed the 
recommendations of two World Bank/FIAS reports (2002 and 2004).   
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State Control of Economic Activity 
49.  Despite the decline in state control since 2002 (a trend that started in 1999), 
Romania’s performance still lags behind that of the OECD average and the EU 15. 
 
50.  The gradual reduction of the state’s presence in the economy was a crucial 
element of the reform package associated with Romania’s EU pre-accession 
commitments.  As a result, between 1999 and 2006, most of the commercial companies 
held in the portfolio of the privatization agency AVAS and in the banking sector were 
privatized.  The energy sector was unbundled and important privatizations took place in 
electricity and gas distribution.  The national oil company was also privatized, although 
the government retains a golden share in Petrom.  In parallel, price liberalization in many 
sectors and the adjustment of energy tariffs reduced direct state involvement in services 
and improved the efficiency of resources allocation.  Nevertheless, public enterprises still 
represent a substantial part of the economy and important energy generation companies, 
whose governance requires further improvement, continue to be managed by the state.  
Some energy tariffs have not yet reached import price parity.  
 
51.  The two measures of state control in the PMR system are public ownership and 
state involvement in business operations (through price controls and coercive as opposed 
to incentive-based regulation).  A look at Figure 11 reveals that Romania does not 
favorably compare with OECD and EU averages and is closer to the more restrictive pre-
accession CEE with respect to both indicators.   
 
Figure 11. Public Ownership and State Involvement in Business Operation 





















































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 




52.  The aggregate indicator for public ownership covers size and scope of public 
enterprise sector, as well as direct control over business enterprises.  Given that there is 
much more variation among EU15 or OECD countries for these indicators, we show the 
full set of comparators (Figure 12).  We find that while the scope of the public sector is  
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below the OECD average, both the degree of control exercised by the state over public 
enterprises and the size of the public enterprise sector are above the OECD average.   
 
53.  The indicator for size is the largest in the sample, suggesting that the public sector 
remains significant in Romania.  This may, however, be an artifact of the methodology: 
the approach follows a perpetual inventory method whereby an initial estimate of the 
public enterprise sector is reduced by an amount equivalent to the value of privatization 
receipts, as captured in the general government budget.   
 
54.  This approach may be creating an upward bias in the computation of the “size” 
indicator for Romania.  This is because a large segment of the Romanian economy was 
privatized through mass privatization (vouchers scheme) whereby the state did not 
receive any privatization proceeds.  A large number of enterprises were acquired by 
domestic investors and, oftentimes, the price component of the deal was not the most 
important.  Rather the divestiture of the large public industrial sector, with the quality of 
its assets often questionable, took primacy in the privatization process.  Sometimes the 
privatized companies were allowed, as part of the privatization contract, to retain part of 
the privatization proceeds for restructuring and upgrades.  In addition, several large 
privatizations deals, done with strategic investors, came to closure after the period of 
analysis covered in the present paper.   
 
55.  Nevertheless, other sources confirm that the Romanian public enterprise sector 
remains important.  Its size was estimated at around 30% of GDP in 2005 by the 
Romanian National Institute for Statistics (this has decreased in 2006, as several 
important privatization deals, especially in banking and energy, went through, such as 
that of the largest bank, BCR).  As to its scope, it is also relatively wide given that the 
state holds important equity stakes in the largest firms in several sectors, such as 
electricity, gas, oil, banking (CEC bank), rail and road infrastructure and municipal 
utilities.   
 
56.  Nonetheless, when looking at the scope of the public sector, which captures the 
extent to which the state holds equity stakes in the largest firm in different sectors, 
Romania is close to the OECD average and in a better position than several EU15 
countries (Figure 12b).  Romania’s standing worsens when public ownership is further 
examined from the point of view of the pervasiveness of the formal control exerted by 
public bodies on public enterprises (Figure 12c).  This result is driven by the presence of 
a golden share retained by the government in the oil sector. The golden share implies that 
important decisions can be taken only with a share of 75% of the board votes. The fact 
that the government controls more than 25% of the votes gives it the power to interfere 
with decisions concerning mergers or acquisitions, changes in the controlling coalition, 
acquisition of equity by foreign investors, choice of management or other strategic 
management decisions.  
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Figure 12 Public Ownership: Size, Scope and Extent of Control over Public Enterprises 
 






































































































































Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values are for 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria and for 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using a different 




Involvement in Business Operation 
 
57.  Regarding state intervention in the overall economy, the use of price controls has 
substantially decreased since the first phase of transition (World Bank 2004).  (The 
variable measures the existence of price regulation or administrative control of prices in 
air travel, road freight, telecommunications, and retail distribution sectors).  However, 
prices for some utilities remain administered, especially in the energy sector, where 
tariffs are below import parity, despite significant adjustments taking place in recent 
years.  Tariffs are also below cost recovery in the case of the least efficient electricity and 
heating generators.  
 
Figure 13. State involvement in business operations 
a. Price controls  b. Use of command-and-control regulation 
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Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
58.  As to the use of command and control regulation, it remains significant, albeit to a 
lesser degree than the EU15 average and on par with the OECD average (Figure 13).  
Overall, it is in line with comparator groups, although Romania’s performance is still far 
from that of the best practice countries (Australia, New Zealand, Slovakia to cite a few).  
The indicator reflects the extent to which government uses coercive (as opposed to 
incentive-based) regulation, in general and in specific service sectors (box 2).  
 
59.  Romania’s relatively good comparative score is driven by the fact that authorities 
have pursued a regulatory reform agenda driven by the highest OECD standards of 
regulatory quality, for instance by enshrining in legislation best OECD practices such as 
the considerations of alternatives to regulation as part of the process of adoption of new 
legislation.  Nonetheless, weak implementation may defeat the purpose of the rules 





Outward Oriented Policies 
 
60.  Observance and implementation of the rules for membership of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and, even more strongly, the European Union (EU) has led to a 
significant reduction of barriers to trade and investment in Romania since the start of 
transition.  Romania’s foreign trade policy has been driven most of all by the 
commitments of the EU Eastern Enlargement project, promoting bilateral trade 
liberalization initially with the EU and EFTA and, subsequently, with other preferential 
partners of the EU.  The Pan-European Agreement on the Cumulation of the Rules of 
Origin, combined with the gradual removal of tariffs on all industrial products by January 
2002
11, and the harmonization of technical standards has led to Romania’s participation 
in a de facto free trade area for industrial products (World Bank, 2004).  The removal of 
tariffs on agricultural and agro-processed goods, in January 2007, as Romania joined the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has completed the liberalization of trade with the 
EU. 
 
                                                 
11 As prescribed by the European Association Agreement between the EU and Romania, signed in 1993. 
Box 3. What the PMR survey means by “command and control” regulation 
 
The contrasting use of  “command-and-control” and “incentive-based” regulation appear to have been 
brought into common usage by Schultze who wrote in a 1977 lecture about economic efficiency: “We 
tend to see only one way of intervening – namely removing a set of decision from the decentralized and 
incentive-oriented private market and transferring them to the command-and-control techniques of 
government bureaucracy” (page 6) 
 
In this context, the PMR attempts to measure the extent to which the cost of new regulation is assessed, 
and whether alternatives are considered before implementing new regulations.  About half of the indicator 
weights are allocated to the following two questions (the full make-up of the indicator is provided in 
Annex table A2.5):  
 
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments (regulatory and non-regulatory) 
before adopting new regulation. (Current answer: yes). 
 
Explanation.  The use of a wide range of mechanisms for meeting policy goals, not just traditional 
regulatory controls, helps to ensure that the most efficient and effective approaches are used. Approaches 
may include green taxes and subsidies, voluntary agreements, information programs such as eco labeling, 
self-regulation, permit-trading schemes, and performance-based regulation (where a sector or industry 
must comply with a standard but can broadly choose how to meet it).  Note that the question only refers to 
whether the obligation exists as a specific provision in a specific legislative act, not whether the spirit of it 
is in fact respected.   A positive answer to the question would require the existence of a normative act 
explicitly ruling out regulation as the default option  
 
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional regulation. (Current answer: no). 
 
Explanation.  The regulatory process is governed by a standard procedure, outlining the steps to be taken 
to issue new regulation. For instance, the procedure may include binding ex ante regulatory impact 
assessment (RIA).  Box 3 offers a discussion of alternatives to traditional regulation. 
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61.  As a testament to Romania’s success in this respect, in conjunction with the 
advancements in structural reforms, net foreign direct investment  inflows increased from 
2.9% of GDP in 2001 to over 9% in 2006 (Figure 14).  FDI went to a variety of sectors, 
notably manufacturing, financial sector, real estate, trade, and transport.  Equally 
important, in recent years, FDI has covered a large part of the expanding external current 
account deficit.  In 2006, for example, FDI covered around 90% of the 10.3% of GDP 
current account deficit.  This is expected to decline in 2007, owing to a slowdown in 
privatization.  Looking forward, strong FDI inflows, and especially greenfield 
investment, as privatization comes to an end, will be instrumental in ensuring continued 
macroeconomic stability and productivity growth.  Therefore, policies aimed at 
improving the business environment would need to be implemented with priority.  
 








Hungary Poland Czech Rep Romania Slovakia Bulgaria
 
Source: WIIW, Eurostat, NBR. 
*Data for Romania refer to 2003-06.     
*Data for Bulgaria refer to 2003-05 
 
62.  Outward oriented policies include explicit barriers to trade and investment (such 
as foreign ownership barriers, discriminatory procedures against foreign firms, and 
tariffs) and regulatory barriers (such as a failure to engage in international harmonization 
treaties etc.)  These are reviewed in turn below, but can be summarized as follows: 
Romania has achieved substantial progress on all count except tariffs, which as of the 
spring of 2006 remained substantially above the EU.  The policy implication of this is nil 
however, since Romania’s tariff policies are now governed by the EU’s foreign trade 
regime as of January 2007.    
 
Explicit Barriers to Trade and Investment 
 
63.  The first generation of reforms, anchored in the 1993 European Association 
Agreement, rapidly succeeded in eliminating all quantitative restrictions and the state 
monopoly over foreign trade (World Bank 2004).  The EU Eastern enlargement project 
rapidly led to Romania’s participation in the European free trade area.  The association 
with the EU also encouraged bilateral trade liberalization with other countries enjoying  
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preferential trade relations with the EU, such as the countries of South Eastern Europe.  
Romania is still part of CEFTA, whose expansion in Eastern Europe it actively 
encourages.  
 
64.  However, Romania did not make similar progress in multilateral trade 
liberalization.  Romania’s tariff levels, measured here as MFN tariffs on industrial goods, 
remained higher in 2006 than both in comparator middle income countries and in all the 
pre-accession OECD CEE (Figure 15).  In particular, Romania entered the EU with 
substantially higher tariff levels than Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic in 2004.  However, as of January 1, 2007, tariff levels have been 
lowered to equal those of the EU Common Market. 
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Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
65.  In contrast, Romania compares well with both high income EU countries and with 
pre-accession CEE countries and other MICs with respect to foreign ownership barriers 
(Figure 16).  Substantial progress has been achieved in this regard compared to 2002.  
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Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
66.  Foreign ownership barriers take the form of statutory or other legal limits to the 
proportion of shares that can be acquired by foreign investor or of special voting rights 
that can be exercised in case of acquisition of equity by foreign investors.  Such 
restriction may apply in general or in specific sectors that are considered ‘strategic’ such 
as air transport, telecommunications, and electricity generation.  The good (low) score of 
this indicator for Romania is due to the absence of both of general ownership barriers and 
barriers in specific sectors.  It should be noted, however, that in Romania such statutory 
or legal restrictions to the proportion of shares acquired by investors, apply not only to 
foreign but also to domestic investors.  For instance, as in other EU countries, a 49% 
foreign ownership ceiling remains in place in the airlines sector. 
 
67.  This means that Romania does not discriminate between domestic and foreign 
firms, a factor that also explains also the better rating at procedural level.  Foreign firms 
in Romania have equal rights with domestic firms to appeal and redress through 
competition agencies, regulatory bodies, trade policy bodies, or private rights of action 
(Figure 17).    
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Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 
a different methodology so is not strictly comparable.  For full data set see appendix I. 
 
Other Barriers to Trade and Investment 
68.  Romania has also completely eliminated other regulatory barriers to trade and 
investment, which were already relatively low in 2002 (Figure 18).  These barriers 
include the existence of specific provisions which require regulators to recognize 
regulatory measures performed in other countries; to use internationally harmonized 
standards and certification procedures; or avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness.   
Engaging in mutual recognition agreements with other countries also helps reducing 
other barriers to trade and investment.  In this respect, Romania has in fact achieved best 
practice. 
 
Figure 18. Regulatory Barriers to Trade and Investment 



















Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2006 for Romania 
and Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries. Romania’s 2002 score was calculated using 




CONCLUSION: THE NEED TO FOCUS ON IMPLEMENTATION, 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
The main conclusions of the report can be summarized as follows:   
 
69.  Romania performs quite well on the PMR indicators, showing a significant 
improvement since 2002: out of the 15 low-level indicators underlying the overall 
PMR, Romania has achieved best practice in seven.  These comprise most of the ones 
falling under barriers to entrepreneurship (licenses and permits systems, communication 
and simplification of rules, administrative burden for corporations, legal barriers to 
competition and antitrust exemptions), and two of the four that make up barriers to trade 
and investment (discriminatory procedures and regulatory barriers). In these indicators 
Romania performs better than the OECD average and on a par with the best OECD 
countries. A third one – tariffs - has now been brought down to the EU average.   
 
70.  Romania could still achieve significant progress in the extent of control the 
state still exerts over the economy.  Indeed, as Figure 19 demonstrates, Romania is still 
far from the OECD average, let alone best practice,
12 with respect to the size of the public 
enterprise sector (although as noted above, this may well be driven by the estimation 
techniques used in this).  More importantly, Romania is also far from best practice 
relative to the nature of the control of public enterprise by legislative bodies, notably 
through the government’s share in Petrom. On the scope of the public enterprise sector, 
the existence of price controls and reliance on command and control regulation 
performance is close to the OECD average.  Finally, in the areas of foreign ownership 
barriers and sector specific administrative burden, it is already better than the OECD and 
very close to best practice on all three counts.   
 








Sector specific burdens 
Direct control
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71.  Concerning the use of command and control regulation, concrete steps could be 
for the Government to issue guidance and training on using alternative to traditional 
regulation – which as Annex Table A2.5 shows, is the principal remaining improvement 
                                                 
12 In the PMR system “best practice” would correspond to an indicator value close to zero, meaning that no 
regulatory restrictions are imposed.  
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still pending.  More substantively, this requires changing the regulatory and 
administrative culture so that new regulation is not the default option to modify economic 
behavior.  Box 4 discusses alternative regulatory approaches.  
 
72.  As to the extent of direct control over business enterprises in which the state holds 
interest, Romania has limited, but not fully eliminated, the use of golden share to affect 
strategic decisions of firms.  Eliminating legal constraints to the sale of the stakes held by 
the government in these firms (a practice followed by more than half OECD countries) is 
the one remaining possible step.   
 
Box 4. Alternative Regulatory approaches 
 
Performance-Based Regulations—specify required outcomes or objectives rather than the means by 
which they must be achieved.  Thus firms and individuals can choose processes that are more efficient 
and less costly, which promotes the use of new technology on a broader scale.  Such type of regulation 
is increasingly used in health, safety, consumer protection, and environmental regulation.  Drawbacks 
include measurement problems related to desired outcomes, higher administrative and monitoring costs, 
greater responsibilities for small companies to develop appropriate compliance strategies.  Most 
countries have resorted to the use of guidelines or “safe harbors” in conjunction with performance-
based regulation.  Guidelines provide information on appropriate compliance strategies, while safe 
harbors allow the benefits of certainty of compliance associated with prescriptive regulation to be 
attained, while also allowing more innovative firms to take advantage of the benefits of such regulation. 
Process Based Regulations—require businesses to develop processes that systematically control and 
minimize production risks. These processes are used in businesses with multiple and complex sources 
of risk, where ex post testing of the product is either ineffective or expensive.  Process based regulation 
is predominantly used in health, food safety, and environmental regulation.   
Co-regulation—businesses take the lead in regulation through endorsement and adherence to codes of 
practice.  This type of regulation is highly cost effective for the government.  Drawbacks include the 
possibility for encouraging anti-competitive activities by business or professional organizations.   
Economic Instruments—taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, vouchers and the like.  Economic 
instruments allow businesses to achieve regulatory goals in the least costly manner and provide market 
incentives which reward the use of innovation and technical change. 
Information and Education—most widely used approach to regulation in OECD member states; 
empower consumers to adopt actions or make informed choices to change their behavior.  Examples 
include campaigns aimed at reducing speeding when driving, anti-litter behaviors; reducing the use of 
drinking water; eco-labeling of products. 
Guidelines—issued by regulatory authorities, setting out processing or providing interpretations to aid 
understanding of government objectives by businesses and citizens.  Guidelines may accompany 
existing regulations, but also are increasingly used as stand-alone documents.  Guidelines, for example, 
are widely used in the area of consumer protection in Denmark.   
Voluntary Approaches—initiated by industries, sometimes formally sanctioned or endorsed by 
government.  They include voluntary initiatives, voluntary codes, voluntary agreements, and self-
regulation.  An example of a voluntary arrangement is the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 






73.  So while Romania can certainly continue to improve on rules and regulations 
governing product market regulations, the pending challenge has to do with improving 
practices. 
 
74.  Without effective implementation and enforcement, the effects of policy 
measures to increase competition in product markets will not be visible.  For 
instance, notwithstanding the enormous progress evident from the dramatic improvement 
since the 2002 PMR, BEEPS data indicate that competitive pressures on incumbents 
remain low compared to other countries in the region and have not substantially changed 
between 2002 and 2005 (Figure 20). 
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Source: WB-EBRD BEEPS 2002 and 2005. 
Note: Percentage of firms responding ‘Many of our customers would buy from our competitors instead’ to 
the question ‘Now I would like to ask you a hypothetical question. If you were to raise your prices of your 
main product line or main line of services 10% above their current level in the domestic market (after 
allowing for any inflation) which of the following would best describe the result assuming that your 
competitors maintained their current prices?’ 
 
75.  A series of prerequisites is necessary to improve the effectiveness of the 
application of regulation and, ultimately, to increase the long run competitiveness of the 
Romanian economy. These belong to the institutional domain and include:  
 
(i)  Political commitment at the highest level.  Ensuring political support from 
the highest level of government is crucial to generate consensus for reform 
both within and outside public administration.  In particular, leadership and 
support from the Prime Minister’s Office and the Presidential Administration 
will help in clarifying the allocation of functions and responsibilities among 
ministries and relevant government agencies with respect to the ownership of 
the reforms. 
(ii)  Changes in the institutional architecture of the government to improve 
oversight and coordination of reforms pertaining to product market 
liberalization.  Political support should be reflected in the reorganization of 
the institutional architecture of government with the objective of improving  
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the coordination and cooperation among implementing agencies and the 
oversight of the overall regulatory process.  In particular, the Business 
Environment Department, responsible for oversight and coordination of the 
implementation of the regulatory reform agenda, should be placed under the 
Prime Minister’s office, where it used to be prior to the latest governmental 
reorganization. 
 
(iii)  Enhanced capacity of the public administration.  Another major obstacle to 
the successful implementation of regulatory reform was identified in the 
ability of the administration to serve the reform agenda.  Important 
shortcomings in this area concern (i) orientation towards compliance with 
formal procedures – as opposed to a drive for results; and (ii) inadequate level 
of qualification, especially in the lower echelons of the civil service, 
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ANNEX I. COMPARISONS WITH FULL SAMPLE  
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Australia 0.9  0.9  0.9 
United Kingdom  0.9  1.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.0  1.4  0.4 
United States  1.0  1.2  0.8 
Ireland 1.1  1.4  0.6 
Denmark 1.1  1.3  0.9 
New Zealand  1.1  1.3  0.9 
Canada 1.2  1.2  1.2 
Sweden 1.2  1.5  0.9 
Luxembourg 1.3  1.6  0.8 
Japan 1.3  1.5  1.0 
Finland 1.3  1.7  0.8 
Belgium 1.4  2.0  0.5 
Netherlands 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Austria 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Slovak Republic  1.4  1.3  1.5 
Germany 1.4  1.9  0.8 
Norway 1.5  1.9  0.9 
Korea 1.5  1.7  1.3 
Romania 1.6  1.8  1.4 
Portugal 1.6  2.0  0.9 
Spain 1.6  2.1  0.9 
Switzerland 1.7  2.1  1.1 
France 1.7  2.1  1.1 
Czech Republic  1.7  2.2  1.1 
Bulgaria 1.8  2.1  1.4 
Greece 1.8  2.2  1.3 
Italy 1.9  2.3  1.3 
Brazil 1.9  1.8  1.9 
Hungary 2.0  2.4  1.5 
Mexico 2.2  2.1  2.3 
Turkey 2.3  2.6  1.8 
Romania 2002  2.4  2.6  2.2 
Poland 2.8  2.9  2.5 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 





Table A1. 2 State Control 
 
   State control  Public ownership  Involvement in 
business operation 
Australia  0.6 0.8 0.3 
Iceland  1.1 1.8 0.3 
United  States  1.2 1.2 1.2 
Denmark  1.3 1.7 0.8 
Slovak  Republic  1.4 1.9 0.8 
New  Zealand  1.4 1.9 0.8 
Japan  1.5 0.8 2.4 
Canada  1.7 1.7 1.5 
Korea  1.7 1.8 1.5 
United  Kingdom  1.7 1.9 1.6 
Mexico  1.9 2.3 1.4 
Sweden  1.9 2.2 1.6 
Netherlands  1.9 2.5 1.2 
Austria  1.9 2.2 1.6 
Ireland  2.0 1.8 2.1 
Luxembourg  2.0 2.6 1.2 
Germany  2.2 2.8 1.5 
Switzerland  2.2 2.4 2.1 
Finland  2.3 3.2 1.3 
Belgium  2.4 2.2 2.6 
Brazil  2.4 2.1 2.8 
Czech  Republic  2.5 3.0 1.9 
France  2.7 3.3 1.9 
Spain  2.7 2.7 2.7 
Portugal  2.7 3.1 2.2 
Norway  2.8 3.5 1.8 
Greece  2.8 2.4 3.3 
Turkey  2.8 3.1 2.5 
Romania  3.2 4.1 2.2 
Italy  3.2 3.8 2.3 
Bulgaria  3.2 3.5 2.8 
Hungary  3.3 3.8 2.6 
Poland  3.6 4.2 2.8 
Romania  2002  3.9 4.6 3.1 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 
countries (Conway et al. 2005).  
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Romania 0.5  0.7  0.1  0.6 
United Kingdom  0.8  0.7  1.2  0.4 
Canada 0.8  0.9  0.5  0.7 
Ireland 0.9  0.5  2.1  0.3 
Norway 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.6 
Sweden 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.6 
Finland 1.1  1.3  1.2  0.4 
Bulgaria 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.4 
Australia 1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5 
New Zealand  1.2  0.8  2.2  0.4 
United States  1.2  1.0  1.3  1.5 
Slovak Republic  1.2  1.9  0.7  0.3 
Luxembourg 1.2  1.8  1.1  0.1 
Denmark 1.2  0.5  2.1  1.7 
Portugal 1.3 1.7 1.2 0.5 
Brazil 1.3  1.5  1.4  0.6 
Romania 2002  1.3  1.3  2.1  0.1 
Italy 1.4  2.4  0.4  0.6 
Japan 1.4  1.9  1.2  0.6 
Hungary 1.4 2.3 0.4 1.1 
Germany 1.6  1.6  2.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.6  1.4  2.4  0.7 
Greece 1.6  2.6 0.6 0.5 
Spain 1.6  2.8  0.4  0.4 
France 1.6  1.9  1.3  1.4 
Belgium 1.6 1.7 2.2 0.6 
Austria 1.6  2.8  0.4  0.8 
Netherlands 1.6  1.6  2.5  0.6 
Korea 1.7  2.2  1.2  1.0 
Switzerland 1.9  1.7  3.1  0.7 
Czech Republic  1.9 2.3 2.3 0.5 
Mexico 2.2  3.1  0.4  2.9 
Poland 2.3  3.7  1.5  0.3 
Turkey 2.5  2.7  3.4  0.5 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 
countries (Conway et al. 2005).  
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Barriers to trade and 
investment  Explicit barriers  Other barriers 
Iceland  0.3 0.5 0.1 
Belgium  0.3 0.5 0.1 
United  Kingdom  0.4 0.5 0.2 
Ireland  0.5 0.8 0.2 
Finland 0.6 1.0 0.2 
Germany  0.6 0.6 0.7 
Netherlands  0.7 1.0 0.3 
Spain  0.7 0.7 0.6 
Austria  0.7 1.0 0.2 
Luxembourg  0.7 1.1 0.2 
United  States  0.7 1.1 0.2 
Norway 0.8 0.9 0.6 
Sweden 0.8 1.2 0.3 
Portugal  0.8 1.2 0.3 
Denmark  0.8 1.0 0.7 
New  Zealand  0.8 1.3 0.2 
Australia  0.9 1.4 0.2 
Czech  Republic  0.9 1.4 0.3 
Japan  0.9 1.4 0.3 
France  1.0 1.5 0.3 
Switzerland  1.0 1.5 0.4 
Canada 1.1 1.7 0.4 
Italy  1.1 1.7 0.4 
Greece  1.2 1.4 1.0 
Korea  1.3 1.9 0.4 
Bulgaria  1.3 2.0 0.4 
Romania  1.3 1.9 0.5 
Hungary  1.4 2.1 0.6 
Slovak  Republic  1.6 1.6 1.5 
Turkey  1.7 2.5 0.6 
Brazil  1.9 2.3 1.5 
Romania  2002  2.1 2.7 1.3 
Mexico 2.4 3.4 1.0 
Poland  2.4 3.0 1.7 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 
countries (Conway et al. 2005).  
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Australia  2.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Austria  3.5 4.0 0.0 2.2 1.3 
Belgium  1.8 3.3 1.5 4.5 1.0 
Brazil  2.9 0.0 3.0 4.2 1.3 
Bulgaria  3.7 3.5 3.3 3.8 1.4 
Canada  2.8 2.1 0.8 1.3 2.0 
Czech Republic  3.8  3.2 2.3 2.3 1.3 
Denmark  2.5 2.3 0.8 1.4 0.0 
Finland  3.5 3.2 2.9 1.4 0.3 
France  4.5 4.1 1.9 3.0 0.3 
Germany  3.3 3.2 2.3 1.8 0.5 
Greece 3.0  3.8  0.9 5.1 2.3 
Hungary  3.5 3.0 4.8 2.3 2.0 
Iceland  2.3 2.8 0.7 0.0 0.3 
Ireland  2.5 2.6 0.8 3.8 0.8 
Italy  4.5 3.7 3.5 1.9 2.0 
Japan  2.0 0.0 0.6 3.0 2.5 
Korea  2.0 2.8 1.0 1.1 2.0 
Luxembourg  3.5 1.2 2.9 1.5 0.0 
Mexico  3.0 3.6 0.9 1.7 1.0 
Netherlands 2.8 2.8 2.0 1.7 0.3 
New  Zealand  2.3 0.8 2.6 0.8 0.0 
Norway  4.8 4.0 2.4 2.2 0.8 
Poland  5.8 4.6 3.0 3.5 1.6 
Portugal  3.8 1.7 3.8 2.0 1.8 
Romania  2.9 4.8 4.4 2.3 1.1 
Romania  2002  4.5 5.0 4.5 3.1 2.6 
Slovak  Republic  1.6 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.4 
Spain  3.5 2.5 2.3 4.4 0.8 
Sweden  3.7 2.7 0.7 2.3 1.0 
Switzerland 3.8 0.9 2.6 1.2 2.6 
Turkey  4.8 4.3 1.0 4.4 0.6 
United  Kingdom  0.8 1.6 2.9 2.3 0.4 
United  States  2.5 0.6 0.8 1.5 0.8 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 
countries (Conway et al. 2005).  
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Australia 2.0 0.2  1.3 0.3  1.6  1.5 
Austria 0.0  0.5  3.0  3.4  0.3  1.0 
Belgium 4.0  0.3 1.8  1.7  1.6  0.0 
Brazil 2.0  0.6  0.5  1.3  2.0  0.0 
Bulgaria 2.0  0.3 1.4  1.9  1.1  0.0 
Canada 0.0  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.6 
Czech Republic  4.0  0.5 3.0  2.2  1.4 0.0 
Denmark 4.0 0.0  1.0 0.3  1.4  1.9 
Finland 2.0  0.3  1.3  1.1  1.4  0.0 
France 2.0  0.3  2.0  1.6  2.2  1.1 
Germany 4.0 0.3  2.3 1.4  1.4  0.0 
Greece 0.0  1.1  2.3 2.9  1.6  0.0 
Hungary 0.0  0.5 2.3  2.0  1.6  0.9 
Iceland 4.0  0.7  1.3  1.6  2.3  0.0 
Ireland 4.0  0.2  0.8  0.3  0.9  0.0 
Italy 0.0  0.5  2.8  2.1  1.9  0.0 
Japan 2.0  0.3  1.5  2.3  1.4  0.3 
Korea 2.0  0.0  2.7  1.9  1.9  0.6 
Luxembourg 2.0  0.0  2.5  0.3  0.3  0.0 
Mexico 0.0  0.3  3.3  3.2  1.9  3.5 
Netherlands 4.0  0.9  2.0  1.3  1.9  0.0 
New Zealand  4.0  0.3  1.0  0.8  0.3  0.4 
Norway 2.0  0.2  1.0  0.9  2.2  0.0 
Poland 2.0  0.8  4.3  4.1  0.6  0.0 
Portugal 0.0  2.6 1.5  1.8  1.4  0.0 
Romania 0.0 0.1  0.8 0.8  2.0  0.0 
Romania 2002  4.0  0.0  1.0  1.4  0.0  0.0 
Slovak 
Republic  0.0 1.4  2.0 1.9  0.6  0.0 
Spain 0.0  0.6  2.8  2.4  1.1  0.0 
Sweden 2.0  0.0  1.0  0.9  2.0  0.0 
Switzerland 6.0  0.0  2.3  0.8  2.2  0.0 
Turkey 6.0  0.5  2.3  3.2  1.4  0.0 
United 
Kingdom  2.0 0.2  0.8 0.6  1.4  0.0 
United States  2.0  0.4  0.8  1.0  1.4  1.6 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 
countries (Conway et al. 2005).  
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Table A1. 5 Barriers to Trade and Investment: values of the low-level indicators 
 
   Ownership barriers   Discriminatory 
procedures   Regulatory barriers   Tariffs  
Australia  2.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Austria  1.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Belgium  0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Brazil  2.0 0.7 1.3 4.0 
Bulgaria  3.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Canada  2.9 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Czech Republic  2.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Denmark  1.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 
Finland  1.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 
France  2.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Germany  0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 
Greece 1.3  2.0 0.7 1.0 
Hungary  1.9 1.2 0.0 3.0 
Iceland  1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ireland  1.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Italy  2.8 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Japan  2.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Korea  2.2 0.0 0.0 3.0 
Luxembourg 1.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Mexico  2.8 1.4 0.0 6.0 
Netherlands  1.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 
New  Zealand 2.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Norway  1.9 0.3 0.7 0.0 
Poland  3.7 0.3 1.6 4.0 
Portugal  1.6 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Romania  0.8 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Romania  2002  2.0 1.2 0.7 5.0 
Slovak  Republic  2.3 1.1 1.6 1.0 
Spain  0.8 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Sweden  1.5 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Switzerland  2.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 
Turkey  3.1 0.7 0.0 3.0 
United  Kingdom  0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 
United  States 1.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2006 for Bulgaria, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other 
countries (Conway et al. 2005).  
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Table A2. 1 





Sector  Yes No
Bulgaria  Romania OECD EU15 Slovak Rep. Poland
16  Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 yes  no na na no yes
232  Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 yes  yes na na no yes
27  Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 yes  no na na no yes
28, 29 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and 
equipment 
1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
4010 
Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity 
transmission or electricity distribution or electricity supply
1 6 0 yes  yes na na yes yes
4020 
Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas 
distribution or gas supply
1 6 0 yes  yes na na yes yes
4100  Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 yes  yes na na - yes
50, 51  Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
55  Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
601, 6303 
Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport 
via railways, operation of railroad infrastrucutre
1 6 0 yes  yes na na no yes
6021  Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 6 0 no  yes na na yes yes
6021 
Other scheduled passenger land transport
  
1 6 0 n.a.  n.a. na na n.a. n.a.
6023  Freight transport by road 1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
6303  Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 yes  yes na na no no
61  Water transport  1 6 0 yes  no na na no yes
6303  Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes  yes na na no yes
62  Air transport  1 6 0 yes  yes na na yes yes
6303  Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes  yes na na no yes
642 
 Telecommunication fixed line services, mobile services, 
internet services. 
1 6 0 yes  yes na na yes yes
6519, 659, 
671 
Financial institutions 1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
66, 672  Insurance  1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
74  Other business activity 1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
851   Human health activities 851 1 6 0 yes  no na na yes yes
9211, 9212  Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 no  no na na no yes
60.87%  47.83% 52.41% 53.63% 27.27% 95.83%
3.65  2.87 3.14 3.22 5.75 1.64
Country score (0-6) 
if number of answers>=20 then 
(Σiai answeri)/Σiai 
Do the national, state or provincial government hold equity stakes in the 




percent of sectors with state 
ownership 
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proceeds as (pct of 
GDP)
1 
Size of public sector 
(0 to 6 index)
2 
1994   6.0 
1995 1.2  5.9 
1996 1.8  5.6 
1997 2.3  5.4 
1998 2.1  5.1 
1999 1.2  5.0 
2000 0.2  4.9 
2001 0.1  4.9 
2002 0.2  4.9 
2003 0.2  4.9 
2004 0.3  4.8 
2005 0.19  4.8 
2006 0.23  4.8 
 
1/ Source 
2/ The 1995 figure is from Gwartney and Lawson (1997), but rescaled from a 0 to 10 scale (with 0 the worst or largest size of the public sector), to follow the 0 to 6 
scale of the PMR (where 6 is now the worst ranking).  Data for subsequent years were calculated relying on a perpetual inventory method type of approach: It= It-1 
+0.2*(Pt-1), where the first It-1 is the original index (equal to zero for 1996) and Pt-1  is the privatization proceeds flow for the year.  We are grateful to Paul Conway for 









Table A2. 4 Price Controls 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15
No
1/4 Score 2.40 2.40 1.23 0.54
1/2 0 no no na na
1/2 0.8 0.8 na na
1/4 Score 0 0 0.87 1.00
1/3 0
no no na na
1/3 0 no no na na
1/3 0
- - na na
1/4 Score 3 2 2 1.63
Yes or - Yes or - No
Yes No 
1/6 6 0  0 yes yes na na
1/6 6 0  0 - no na na
1/6 6 0  0 yes no na na
1/6 6 0  0 no no na na
1/6 6 0  0 yes yes na na
1/6 6 0  0 - yes na na
Score 0 0 0 0
1/4 1 0
no no na na
Overall score 1.35 1.10 1.01 0.83
6
6
Retail prices of  certain staples (e.g. milk and bread) are subject to price controls
6
Retail prices of road freight services are regulated in some way by the government
Government provides pricing guidelines to road freight companies 6
6
Retail prices of gasoline are subject to price controls 
Retail prices of  tobacco are subject to price controls 
Prices of domestic air fares are regulated 
Relatif number of 5 or 4 busiest routes subject to price regulation 
Road freight
Retail prices of  alcohol are subject to price controls 
Retail prices of pharmaceuticals are subject to price controls 
Professional bodies or representatives of trade and commercial interests are involved 
in specifying or enforcing pricing guidelines or regulations 
Retail distribution 












(n/5)*6 or (n/4)*6 
Scale for Retail 
Retail prices of other product are subject to price controls 
Telecommunication 
Country scores (0-6) 
Retail prices of digital mobile service in telecommunications are regulated 
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Table A2. 5 Use of command and control regulation  
 
Yes No
Bulgaria Romania OECD  EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
1/2 
1/2 0 6
no yes n.a.  n.a. yes yes
1/2 0 6
no no n.a.  n.a. no yes
1/2  n.a.  n.a.
1/4 n.a.  n.a.
1/8 6 0
no no n.a.  n.a. no no
1/8 6 0
no no n.a.  n.a. no no
1/8 6 0
no no n.a.  n.a. no no
1/8 6 0
no no n.a.  n.a. no no
1/4 n.a.  n.a.





1/4 n.a.  n.a.
1 6 0
no no n.a.  n.a. yes no
1/4 n.a.  n.a.
1 6 0
yes yes n.a.  n.a. yes no
3.8 2.3 2.2  2.6 3.5 0.0
Note: (1)  Yes= State, National+State, National;                       No  = Local, National+local, States+local, No 











(a  i  ) 
  
The regulation of opening hours became more 
flexible in the last 5 years 
Air travel 
Shop opening hours are regulated 
Government regulations on shop opening hours 
apply at national level  (1) 




Σ kc k answer ijk
Carriers operating on domestic routes are subject to 
universal service requirements (e.g. obligation to 
serve specified customers or areas) 
Railways 
Companies operating the infrastructure or providing 
railway services are subject to universal service 
requirements (e.g. obligation to serve specified 
customers or areas) 
Regulations prevent or constrain contract carriage 
(contractual relation between an otherwise 
independent haulier and one shipper) 
Regulations prevent or constrain intermodal 
operations                                         (operating or 




Regulations prevent or constrain backhauling 
(picking up freight on the return leg) 
Regulations prevent or constrain private carriage 
(transport only for own account) 
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy 
instruments (regulatory and non-regulatory) before 
adopting new regulation 
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to 
traditional regulation 
Coding of answers
General information  
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Table A2. 6 Licenses and permits system  
Yes No Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
1/3 0 6 no yes n.a. n.a. no yes
1/3 0 6 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/3 0 6 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
20 2 . 222 0
Coding of answers
Country scores (0-6)
The 'silence is consent' rule (i.e. that licenses are
issued automatically if the competent licensing office
has not acted by the end of the statutory response
period) is used at all
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)
for getting information on notifications and licenses
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)









Table A2. 7 Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
1/2
2/12 6 - yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/12 6 - yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes























1/3 yes no n.a. n.a. yes no
1/3 no yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/3 yes yes n.a. n.a. no no









National government (all ministries and agencies) keeps 
a complete count of the number of permits and licenses 
required 
There are systematic procedures for making regulations 
known and accessible to affected parties
There is a general policy requiring "plain language" 
drafting of regulation
There are inquiry points where affected or interested 
foreign parties can get information on the operation and 
enforcement of regulations
Affected parties have the right to appeal against 
adverse enforcement decisions in individual cases
Government policy imposes specific requirements in 
relation to transparency/freedom of information 
government wide
Country weight (0-1) 
Administrative burdens for corporation
Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
Sector specific administrative burdens 
2/12
Communication
There is an explicit program to reduce the administrative 
burdens imposed by government on enterprises and/or 
citizens
There is a program underway to review and reduce the 
number of licenses and permits required by the national 
government
Simplification










1/2*(Wi-Min W)/(Max W98- Min W)










Table A2. 8 Administrative burden on corporations 
01234 5 6
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
Number of mandatory procedures required to register 
a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 <=3 <=5 <=8 <=12 <=16 <=20 >20
11 5 14.9 14.5 28 15
Number of public and private bodies to contact to 
register a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
5.0 5.1 6 8
Number of working days required to complete all 
mandatory procedures for registering a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration)
1/4 <=16.4 <=32.8 <=49.2 <=65.6 <=82 <=98.4 >98.4
32 11 23.8 22.3 90 15
Total cost (euros) of registering a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=500 <=1000 <=1500 <=2500 <=5000 <=7500 >7500
180.33 107.54 1108.14 899.07 n.a 721.97







NOTE: Values for Bulgaria and Romania were obtained based on Doing Business 2005 data. Since Doing Business information on number of procedures, number of 
days and cost connected with starting a company are not directly comparable to the same information in the OECD International Regulation Database, a normalization 
process was necessary to homogenize the scores obtained. The normalization process proceeded as follows.  
1) A standard score (also called z-score or normal score) was obtained as Z = (raw score - mean
OECD-DB)/standard deviation
OECD-DB based on the Doing Business 
sample, where the values for OECD countries refer to Doing Business 2003. The z-score reveals how many units of the OECD standard deviation Bulgaria and 
Romania are above or below the OECD mean. 



























































Yes No - no no na na yes No
4321 0 -
1/3 yes no na na yes yes
1/3 no yes na na no no













































size of outlet 









size of outlet 



















na na always required
depends on 
size of outlet
1.88 0.75 1.67 1.56 4.11 1.91
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a 
commercial activity for selling food products 
Country scores (0-6)
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a 
commercial activity for selling clothing products 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 








Registration in commercial register is needed to start 
up a commercial activity for selling clothing products 
10
In order to establish a national road freight business, 
operators need to obtain a license (other than a 
driving license) or permit from the government or a 
regulatory agency
There are criteria other than technical and financial 
fitness and compliance with public safety 
requirements considered in decisions on entry of 
new operators
These entry regulations apply also if a firm wants to 
transport only for its own account
Registration in commercial register is needed to start 
up a commercial activity for seeling food products 









startups       w=wi 
/ Max w98
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 
commercial acitivity (not related to outlet siting)  for 
selling clothing products
 Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in 
addition to compliance with general urban planning 
provisions) for selling food products
 Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in 
addition to compliance with general urban planning 
provisions) for selling clothing products
Road freight
Retail distribution
Sector specific administrative burdens
10
Coding of answers
In order to establish a national road freight business, 
operators need to notify any level of government or a 
regulatory agency and wait for approval before they 
can start operation
Registration in transport register is required in order 
to establish a new business in the road freight sector
In order to operate a national road freight business, 





















"depends on type of  "no requirement"   
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Table A2. 10 Legal barriers to entry 
ISIC      
(rev. 3.1)  
code
Sector Yes No Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 - no n.a. n.a. no no
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
28, 29 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment  1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
4010
Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity transmission or electricity 
supply
1 6 0 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
4020 Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas supply 160 yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 yes no n.a. n.a. no -
50, 51 Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
55 Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
601, 6303
Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, 
Operation of railroad infrastrucutre
1 6 0 no yes n.a. n.a. no no
6021 Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 6 0 - no n.a. n.a. no no
6021 Other scheduled passenger land transport 1 6 0 no - n.a. n.a. - -
6023 Freight transport by road 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 no yes n.a. n.a. no no
61 Water transport 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
62 Air transport  1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes yes n.a. n.a. no no
642
 Telecommunication: fixed-line network, fixed-line services, mobile services, 
internet services
1 6 0 no yes n.a. n.a. no no
6519, 659, 
671
Financial institutions 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
66, 672 Insurance 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
74 Other business activity 160 n o yes n.a. n.a. no no
851  Human health activities  1 6 0 - - n.a. n.a. - -
9211, 
9212
Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 no no n.a. n.a. no no
19% 33% 5% 23% 10% 10%
1.1 2.0 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.6
proportion of sectors with legal 
Country scores (0-6)
 if number of answers>=20 then 
 iai answeri)/iai 
National, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict the number of 




•  Electricity: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: electricity generation/import or 
electricity transmission or electricity supply 
•  Gas: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: gas production/import or gas transmission 
or gas supply 
•  Railways: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the three following sectors: Passenger transport via railways, 
Freight transport via railways, Operation of railroad infrastructure 
•  Telecommunication: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: fixed-line network, fixed-
line services, mobile services, internet services.  
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Table A2. 11 Antitrust exemptions for public enterprises or state-mandated actions 
 
Yes No
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
Is there rule or principle providing for exclusion or exemption 
from liability under the general competition law for conduct that 
is required or authorized by other government authority (in 
addition to exclusions that might apply to complete sectors)?
1/4 6 0
no no n.a. n.a. no no
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 


















Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 
exclusion or exemption from competition law such as vertical 

















Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 

















Country scores (0-6) 00 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0
Coding of answers
Weight                =wi  
= (Scope + Size 
of public sector 
enterprises)/2) 
wi∗Σkck answerk / wi
max   




Table A2. 12 Foreign ownership barriers 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
2/3*wi (% of 
business sectors 
in which the state 
controls at least a 
firm)







n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes
6 none none n.a. n.a. none none
<50% <40% <35% <30% <25%




concecpt of the 
ownership and 
control could be 
applicable
3.0 0.8 1.8 1.3 3.7 2.3
Memo item
61% 48% n.a. n.a. 96% 27%
Memo item:  % of business sectors in which the state controls 
at least a firm
Country scores (0-6)
Sector-specific barriers





There are statutory or other legal 
limits to the number or proportion of 
shares that can be acquired by 
foreign investors in publicly-controlled 
firms
Special government rights can be 
exercised in the case of acquisition of 
equity by foreign investors
Σjbj Σkck answerjk
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Table A2. 13  Discriminatory procedures 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
General discrimination 2/3
3/6 yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
2/6 yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/6 yes 0 n.a. n.a. no yes
Competition discrimination 1/3 n.a. n.a.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes Yes No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- Yes No/- Yes No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes no
Yes No/- Yes No/- Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- yes 0 n.a. n.a. yes yes
0 0.75 0.75 1.5 2.625 2.625 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 4.125 4.125 5.25 5.25 5.25 6
0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.25 1.13 Σjbj Σkck answerjk
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition and 
hence prevent effective access of foreign firms (foreign owned or 
controlled) to such markets, foreign firms can have redress 
through regulatory authorities involved 
Country scores (0-6)
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition 








When appeal procedures relating to regulatory decisions are 
available in domestic regulatory systems, they are open to 
affected or interested foreign parties as well
There are specific provisions which require that regulations, prior 
to entry into force, be published or otherwise communicated to the 
public in a manner accessible at the international level
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition 
foreign firms can have redress through trade policy bodies
0
0
0-6 Scale for competition discrimination
When business practices are perceived to restrict competition 
foreign firms can have redress through competition agencies
6
6
Country has any specific provisions which require or encourage 
explicit recognition of the national treatment principle when 
applying regulations, so as to guarantee non-discrimination 





Table A2. 14 Tariffs trade barriers 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak  Republic
Average production-weighted tariff <=3% <=6% <=9% <=12% <=15% <=18% >18% 8.6 15.8 5.5 4.4 13.4 5.1






Table A2. 15 Regulatory barriers to trade and investment 
 
Bulgaria Romania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
Yes No
The country has engaged in Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) in at least a sector with any 
other country
2/5 0 6 yes yes na na yes yes
There are specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulators to consider recognizing the 
equivalence of regulatory measures or the result 
of conformity assessment performed in other 
countries, wherever possible and appropriate
4/15 0 6 yes yes na na no no
There are specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulators to use internationally 
harmonized standards and certification 
procedures wherever possible and appropriate
2/9 0 6 yes yes na na yes yes
There are any specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulatory administrative procedures to 
avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness
1/9 0 6 yes yes na na yes yes
Country scores (0-6) 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.18 0.00 1.60
Coding of answers
Σkck answerjk
Question 
weights 
(c k)
 
 
 
 